Guide Metaethics: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide

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Ethics in the Quran. Theological MetaEthics. It is controversial whether Korsgaard is even arguing for a genuinely metaethical view; see Hussain and Shah Enoch usefully places Korsgaards view in the context of similar views that attempt to ground normativity in claims about what is constitutive of action. Enoch, David. From What Is Constitutive of Action. Hussain, Nadeem, and Nishi Shah.

Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaards Rejection of Realism. Argues that Korsgaard has failed to provide an alternative to moral realism because she fails to distinguish between normative judgments and metaethical interpretations of moral judgment. Hussain and Shah have papers in the same vein in preparation.

Korsgaard, Christine M. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. A collection of articles mainly on the Kantian background to Korsgaards views. The Sources of Normativity. In the first half of the book Korsgaard works towards her favored view from a historical perspective.

Alex Miller

The second half contains critical replies by Cohen, Geuss, Nagel, and Williams, with counter-replies from Korsgaard herself. Collects together a number of Korsgaards previously published papers, particularly noteworthy among them being Realism and Constructivism in 20th Century Moral Philosophy. Self-Constitution, Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Korsgaards most recent extended exposition of her views, based on her Locke Lectures at Oxford. Non-reductive naturalism NRN is a form of moral realism often called Cornell Realism because many of its leading protagonists are or were associated with Cornell University.

Non-reductive naturalists hold that moral properties make a genuine and ineliminable contribution to the best explanation of experience in particular, of moral belief and as such count as irreducible but natural. Sturgeon is a key paper in the NRN tradition; a good way into the view is to see it as a reply to the skeptical challenge according to which moral properties and facts never explain anything developed in the opening chapters of Harman The rest of the sources mentioned here all contribute one way or another to the debate initiated by Harman and Sturgeon: Boyd , Nelson , Sturgeon a, and Sturgeon b argue in favor of NRN, while Harman and Leiter offer critiques.

Dworkin questions Harmans framework for evaluating moral realism. Boyd, Richard N. How to Be a Moral Realist.


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In Essays on Moral Realism. Edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, The most detailed working-out of a semantics for NRN. Dworkin, Ronald. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 : Harman, Gilbert. Chapters 1 and 2 are the locus classicus for the view that moral facts and properties are explanatorily inefficacious. A reply to Sturgeon Leiter, Brian. Moral Facts and Best Explanations. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 : Nelson, Mark T. Moral Realism and Program Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 : Sturgeon, Nicholas.


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  • Moral Explanations. In Morality, Reason, and Truth. Edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, Rowman and Allanheld, The locus classicus for the view that moral facts and properties are explanatorily efficacious.

    Alex Miller

    Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 a : A reply to Harman , which critiques Sturgeon Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 b : Further development of the NRN view defended in Sturgeon Since it is naturalist, it avoids Mackie-style arguments from queerness, but since it eschews the idea that moral expressions are synonymous with naturalistic expressions, it avoids whatever version of the open question argument survives the standard criticisms.

    Copp and van Roojen offer critiques of the moral twin-earth argument. Copp, David.

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    Synthese : Horgan, Terence, and Mark Timmons. Journal of Philosophical Research 16 : This paper argues that ifas NRN hopesthe semantics of moral expressions can be modeled on the standard Kripke-Putnam semantics for natural kind. By describing a moral twinearth scenario, the paper argues that in fact the natural kind case is radically different from the moral case.

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    Synthese 92 a : Philosophical Papers 21 b : Takes the argument of Horgan and Timmons further, by arguing that a form of the open question argument survives to haunt NRN. Horgan, Terrence, and Mark Timmons. Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth. Good on Twin-Earth. Philosophical Issues 8 : Attempts to develop a semantics for a realist view capable of deflecting the moral twin earth argument. It comes in two main varieties, synthetic in which no appeal is made to. The foremost contemporary reductionist naturalist is Peter Railton, while the foremost proponents of the analytic variety of naturalist reductionism are Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit.

    Railtons Reductive Naturalism Railton proposes a two-step reductive account of moral rightness. First, the notion of an agents well-being is identified with what the agent would desire to desire if he were in conditions of full factual information and perfect instrumental rationality. Second, moral rightness is identified with what is instrumentally rational from a social point of view. The identities are delivered courtesy of a reforming definition, in essence an empirical hypothesis that is justified on the basis of enabling explanations of the relevant phenomena.

    The proposed reduction is thus synthetic in nature. See Railton a, Railton b, Railton , and Railton Brandt is useful background, while Wiggins , Wiggins , and Sobel offer stimulating critiques. Brandt, Richard B. A Theory of the Good and Right. The early chapters develop the notion of reforming definition utilized by Railton.

    Moral Realism. Philosophical Review 95 a : Facts and Values.

    Philosophical Topics 14 b : 5 Further elaboration of the view proposed in Railton a. Naturalism and Prescriptivity.

    ‎Metaethics: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide on Apple Books

    Social Philosophy and Policy 7 : Collects together Railtons most important contributions to metaethics and also normative ethics. Sobel, David. Full-Information Accounts of Well-Being. A very useful paper for metaethicists unfamiliar with the debates in normative ethics about the constitution of well-being.

    Edited by Lewis E. Hahn, Argues that even synthetic naturalism is susceptible to a sophisticated descendent of Moores open-question argument. A Neglected Position? Part of an important four-paper symposium in which Railton and Wiggins battle it out.

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    Analytic Moral Functionalism Jackson and Pettit attempt a reductive account of moral properties that proceeds by applying the method of conceptual analysis invented by Frank Ramsey and adopted by David Lewis in the service of a reductive account of the mental see Lewis See Jackson , Jackson , and Jackson and Pettit For criticism see Smith , Zangwill , and Horgan and Timmons McFarland and Miller tries to deflect Smith Edited by Ian Ravenscroft, Horgan and Timmons attempt to adapt their well-known moral twin-earth argument previously used against synthetic naturalism against Jacksons analytic functionalism.

    There is a reply by Jackson in the same volume. Jackson, Frank. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 : Contains a basic statement of the analytic functionalist approach in the moral case.